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The tradition of government by consent, the nature of the
federal constitution, and the reasoning of the United States
Supreme Court' have compelled each state to fashion its own
compact between the government and the citizenry.2 The gov-
ernment of the State of Washington, no less than that of the
United States, is a product of such a compact. The preamble to
the 1889 Washington Constitution reads: "We, the people of
the State of Washington, grateful to the Supreme Ruler of the
Universe for our liberties, do ordain this constitution,"3 and
section 1 of the Declaration of Rights (article I) declares that
"All political power is inherent in the people, and the govern-
ments derive their just powers from the consent of the gov-
erned, and are established to protect and maintain individual
rights."4 Indeed, the founders of the state regarded the consti-
tution as a compact between citizens and their government and
viewed the writing of this covenant as a difficult philosophical
and political enterprise.
Clearly, the structure of the judiciary and the role of the
State Supreme Court in the governing process were major
parts of the enterprise. This Article will discuss (1) the politics
that influenced the drafting of the judicial article (article IV)
* Charles H. Sheldon is a Professor of Political Science and Michael Stohr-
Gillmore is a political science graduate student at Washington State University.
1. In Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243 (1833), Chief Justice John Marshall
explained the "dual compact" concept: "The Constitution was ordained and
established by the people of the United States for themselves, for their own
government, and not for the government of the individual states. Each state
established a constitution for itself, and in that constitution, provided such limitations
and restrictions on the powers of its particular government as its judgment dictated."
Id. at 247.
2. See D. ELAZAR & J. KINCAID, COVENANT, POLITY AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
(1987).
3. WASH. CONST. preamble.
4. Id. art. 1, § 1.
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in the constitutional convention; (2) the election of the first
five members of the bench and the backgrounds of those inau-
gural judges; (3) the particular approach toward judicial review
adopted by these five jurists (activism-restraint); and (4) the
personal relations among these members of the supreme court.
This Article will provide a personal perspective of the first five
judges and their court.
I. THE CONSTITUTIONAL COMPACT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
As with all writers of constitutions since the beginnings of
the American Republic, the formidable task confronting the
seventy-five delegates to the 1889 Washington Constitutional
Convention was to reconcile two antithetical demands.5 They
had to design a fundamental law that would endow the new
government with sufficient power to effectively carry out the
diverse duties assigned and, at the same time, impose meaning-
ful constraints on that government to prevent the abuse of
power. Writing a constitution was an exercise in balancing
these demands.
In contrast to their federal counterparts in Philadelphia
102 years earlier, however, Washington's founding fathers
worked from a different constitutional premise. The govern-
ment of the Union, like that of the state, was to be a govern-
ment of limited powers.6 But the Union's governing power was
confined to those functions enumerated in the constitutional
document. In contrast, government under the Washington
Constitution possessed plenary powers, and consequently, any
limits were to be enumerated in the fundamental law.7 A par-
simonious grant of power was to hold the federal government
in check while a generous inventory of limits would control
5. B. ROSENOW, THE JOURNAL OF THE WASHINGTON STATE CONSTITUTIONAL
CONVENTION (1962) [hereinafter ROSENOW JOURNAL].
6. Chief Justice John Marshall stated the principle as follows:
This original and supreme will organizes the government, and assigns to
different departments their respective powers. It may either stop here, or
establish certain limits not to be transcended by those departments.
The government of the United States is of the latter description. The
powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may
not be mistaken, or forgotten, the constitution is written.
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 176 (1803).
7. R. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on
Federal Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional
Grounds, 63 TEx. L. REV. 1025 (1985).
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state government. According to Justice James A. Andersen of
the Washington high bench:
As this court has often observed, the United States Constitu-
tion is a grant of limited power authorizing the federal gov-
ernment to exercise only those constitutionally enumerated
powers expressly delegated to it by the states, whereas our
state constitution imposes limitations on the otherwise ple-
nary power of the state to do anything not expressly forbid-
den by the state constitution or federal law.'
The difference has consequences. For example, the"explicit affirmation of fundamental rights" in article I of the
state constitution, is a "guaranty of those rights."9 The state is
compelled to enforce the observance of those rights, not
merely refrain from breaching them, as in the federal scheme.
Excessive power is further checked by creating and main-
taining a proper balance between the executive, legislative, and
judicial branches. Finally, the Declaration of Rights of the
state constitution, reinforced by the imposition of provisions of
the Federal Bill of Rights through the doctrine of incorpora-
tion,'0 provides additional checks against the overreach of gov-
ernment and, in some cases, of private intrusions into
individual affairs."
Thus, the compact, the separation of powers, the Declara-
tion of Rights, and the fourteenth amendment to the Federal
Constitution safeguard against the abuse of state power. Cru-
cial to the imposition of these limits is the judiciary, for the
judges are responsible for ascribing meaning to these confining
provisions of the constitution through the power of judicial
review. 12
The members of the 1889 Washington Constitutional Con-
8. State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash. 2d 54, 66, 720 P.2d 808, 815 (1986).
9. Id. at 62, 720 P.2d at 812.
10. Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968). See R. CORTNER, THE SUPREME
COURT AND THE SECOND BILL OF RIGHTS (1981).
11. Alderwood Assoc. v. Washington Envtl. Council, 96 Wash. 2d 230, 635 P.2d 108
(1981).
12. See generally C. HAINES, THE AMERICAN DOCTRINE OF JUDICIAL SUPREMACY
(1932); C. WOLF, THE RISE OF MODERN JUDICIAL REVIEW (1986); C. Sheldon, Judicial
Review and the Supreme Court of Washington, 1890-1986, 17 PUBLIUS 69 (1987)
[hereinafter Judicial Review]; Nelson, Changing Conception s of Judicial Review: The
Evolution of Constitutional Theory in the States, 1760-1860, 120 U. PA. L. REV. 1166
(1972); M. NELSON, A STUDY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW IN VIRGINIA, 1789-1928 (1947); F.
SMITH, JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION IN NEW YORK 1906-1930 (1952); 0. FIELD,
JUDICIAL REVIEW OF LEGISLATION IN TEN SELECT STATES (1943).
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vention were aware of this central role of the courts. Long
before statehood was awarded Washington, courts in other
states had established the power to void the actions of the
other departments and agencies of government. 3 Even before
Chief Justice John Marshall affirmed the power of judicial
review for federal courts in Marbury v. Madison,4 a number
of state courts had negated the acts of their legislatures.' 5 By
1818, all states but Rhode Island recognized the validity of judi-
cial review.' 6 Nonetheless, judicial review was used only spar-
ingly. "It was not until after the Civil War . . . that the
doctrine of the legislatively declared will of the people gave
way before the doctrine of the supremacy of the law judicially
interpreted.' 17
The "Golden Age" of the judiciary was reached when the
common law dominated the jurisprudence of the times. James
Willard Hurst summarized the period into which Washington
was thrust into statehood:
Actually, between 1820 and 1890 the judges were already
taking the initiative in lawmaking. Far anticipating the lead-
ership of the executive or administrative arms, the courts
built upon the common law in the United States-a body of
judge-made doctrine to govern people's public and private
affairs. At the same time the courts played a great role not
only in declaring, but also in administering, policy.' 8
Through the use of injunctions and receiverships, courts were
also assuming regulatory roles. By 1889, interventionist judi-
cial review was commonly exercised if not commonly praised.'9
It was during this age of judicial activism that the founders
gathered in Olympia in 1889 to write their governing compact.
II. •ARTICLE IV AND THE FOUNDERS
Much of what eventually found its way into the judicial
13. Rutgers v. Waddington (N.Y.C. Mayor's Ct. 1784); Bayard v. Singleton, 1 N.C.
(Mart.) 42 (1787); Trevett v. Weeden (R.I. 1787); Cases of the Judges, 8 Va. (4 Call) 135
(1788); Holmes v. Walton (N.J. 1780). "Between 1787 and 1803 state courts held void
state laws in more than twenty instances." A. KELLY & W. HARBISON, THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 94 (1976).
14. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
15. F. AUMANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM 191 (1969).
16. Id.
17. Id. at 160.
18. J. HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW 85 (1950).
19. See Judicial Review, supra note 12, at 80.
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article (article IV) of the Washington Constitution was dictated
by the territorial experience. Since 1853, upon the separation
from Oregon, Washington Territory was served by three
Supreme Court judges, appointed by the President and con-
firmed by the United States Senate.20 Justices of the peace and
probate judges provided a local dimension for the judiciary.2
The three territorial high court judges rode circuit, hearing tri-
als in their respective jurisdictions and meeting once a year in
Olympia to hear appeals from their trials. 22 In 1884, another
judge joined the three in order to allow a three-judge panel
with rotating membership to hear cases, thus permitting the
fourth member to excuse himself from reviewing trials over
which he had presided as circuit judge.23
Although a number of the territorial judges were
respected, competent, and devoted public servants, the local
citizenry viewed many of them with distrust.24 Territorial
courts were legislative courts and thus at the mercy of the
Congress. Incumbents were appointed and removed for parti-
san reasons. They were often selected with little or no regard
for local feelings. Half of those appointed were outsiders. The
dangers and discomforts of travel, the Indian wars, and the
need to reside in often remote districts prompted several of the
justices to remain away from their assignments.25
The elected justices of the peace and probate judges were
given greater responsibilities by the Territorial Legislature out
of frustration with the often-absent territorial judges and to
gain a degree of timely justice.26 These territorial experiences
were not lost on the seventy-five delegates at the 1889 Consti-
tutional Convention held in the territorial capital of Olympia
in July and August.
W. Lair Hill, a successful attorney, former territorial judge
20. C. SHELDON, A CENTURY OF JUDGING: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE
WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT 15 (1988) [hereinafter A CENTURY OF JUDGING].
21. J. WUNDER, INFERIOR COURTS, SUPERIOR JUSTICE (1979). See also E. POMEROY,
THE TERRITORIES AND THE UNITED STATES, 1861-1890 (1969) [hereinafter POMEROY].
22. POMEROY, supra note 21, at 52; A CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 20, at 15-
16.
23. A CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 20, at 16.
24. Hall, Hacks and Derelicts Revisited. American Territorial Judiciary 1789-
1959, 14 WASH. HIsT. Q. 289 (1981).
25. AIREY, A HISTORY OF THE CONSTITUTION AND GOVERNMENT OF WASHINGTON
TERRITORY 272 (1945) (doctoral dissertation available at the University of Washington
library).
26. POMEROY, supra note 21, at 59, 61.
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(1870-71), and ex-reporter for the Portland Oregonian, was
commissioned by his former newspaper to draft a model consti-
tution Relying heavily on the 1879 California Constitution,
Hill drafted his version, which was made available to the dele-
gates and ultimately provided the exact wording for fifty-one
sections and similar wording for forty-one sections of Washing-
ton's fundamental law. The Constitution of California pro-
vided the wording for forty-five sections. Oregon's
fundamental law accounted for twenty-three provisions, Wis-
consin's for twenty-seven, and Indiana's for seven.2" An earlier
attempt at constitution-writing also supplied examples for the
Olympia convention.29 In 1878, at Walla Walla, a draft consti-
tution was completed and received the approval of the voters
but was defeated in Congress while in committee. Nineteen
sections of the 1889 document were borrowed straight from the
earlier version and thirty sections had nearly the same word-
ing used in the 1878 draft. Although opportunities for creativ-
ity and for consideration of unique features of the state were
present, the delegates to the convention obviously relied most
heavily on the experiences of other states.
The judicial article closely followed the Hill model"0 and
prompted enlivened debate, of which surprisingly little was
motivated by partisan considerations. The delegates had antici-
pated otherwise. The Republicans controlled the convention"'
and correctly anticipated assuming the responsibility for the
new government upon statehood. They intended to use the
convention to consolidate their position. In the words of
Republican delegate Trusten P. Dyer: "The Democrats intend
to thrust the responsibility for what is done by this convention
upon the Republican Party, and this being the case it is there-
27. According to Lebbus J. Knapp, the convention notes of the day (July 10th)
read: "The admirable draft of a state constitution by W. Lair Hill, which appeared in
the Oregonian of the 4th inst., has been the theme of many members who look upon it
in the main as just such a constitution as is needed for the new state. The Oregonian
of that date has been largely in demand by the members ever since its issue." Knapp,
Origins of the Constitution of the State of Washington, 4 WASH. HIST. Q. 253 (1913).
28. See STATE OF WASHINGTON LEGISLATIVE MANUAL 356 (1985).
29. See Beckett, The Constitutional Framework, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS
OF WASHINGTON STATE (1978); P. BECKT, FROM WILDERNESS TO ENABLING ACT: THE
EVOLUTION OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON (1968).
30. WASH. CONST. art. IV. Knapp concluded that the Hill draft "probably
contributed more to the finished product as adopted by the convention than any other
written document." 4 WASH. HIST. Q. 241.
31. The Republican delegates at the convention numbered 43, the Democrats 29.
Three were independents. A CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 20, at 25.
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fore only right and just to ourselves that we put the stamp of
the party upon our acts." 2 The Seattle Daily Times continued,"most of the Republicans coincide in this, and a caucus will be
held this evening to determine upon a plan of action."3 3 How-
ever, partisanship remained subdued during most of the discus-
sions on article IV.s' Only when the debate turned to how the
judges were to be selected did politics appear on the agenda.15
Afterward, however, party loyalties were quickly forgotten as
the delegates moved to considering matters of court jurisdic-
tion and judicial salaries.
On July 16, the Judiciary Committee reported its version
of article IV."6 The majority report recommended a court of
three judges, the number on the earlier territorial high court
and on many other states' high courts. They further recom-
mended terms of six years for the jurists. However, a minority
of the Committee (composed of one Democrat and five Repub-
licans, including future high court Judges Dunbar and Stiles),
although agreeing with the term of six years, urged a court
with five members.3 7
The minority feared that a three-member bench would be
dominated by one strong judge or by corporate interests. For
example, Dunbar "thought it would be a one man power."
He contended that corporations were just as anxious to con-
trol judges as legislators, and the way would be made easy
with a bench of three judges. "Caesar said that his wife
should not only be virtuous but should be above suspicion,
and our courts should not only be incorruptible, but be
above suspicion of being so" concluded the honorable
gentleman. 38
Also, five judges meant that much more "wisdom and integ-
rity" would be brought to bear on the troublesome issues that
32. Seattle Daily Times, July 3, 1889, at 1, col. 4.
33. Id.
34. No Republican or Democrat "line-up" was evident from the newspaper records
of the convention. ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 5, at 593-629.
35. See infra text accompanying notes 41-58.
36. ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 5, at 607.
37. The minority report read: "We concur in the... report of the majority of the
committee on the judicial department with the following exceptions: That the
supreme court provided for in section 2 be composed of five instead of three judges and
that said section be so amended." Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 17, 1889, at 1, col. 6.
Judge Hoyt, the presiding officer, threw his weight behind an enlarged court. He
announced his support for the minority report immediately following its reading. Id.
38. Seattle Daily Times, July 19, 1889, at 1, col. 3.
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would confront the court.3 9
Opponents of the larger court argued that it would add
unnecessarily to the costs of the new government. Addition-
ally, they argued the demands on the court would not be too
great for three judges. As one delegate put it, even with a
three-judge bench, "they would have a very soft snap of it."
40
The minority report was adopted (forty-four votes "for" with
the "nays" unrecorded) after the addition of an amendment
permitting the legislature to increase the number of judges and
to authorize the court to sit in departments.4 '
The issue of judges' selection brought out partisan loyal-
ties. The Judiciary Committee had quickly dismissed as unac-
ceptable a proposal to have the supreme court judges subject to
gubernatorial appointments with legislative approval. The
committee reported: "We have considered the proposition ...
providing for the supreme court to be appointed by the gover-
nor, but think it most in accord with the genius of our institu-
tions that these offices should be made elective."'  Memories
of the unresponsiveness of the appointed territorial judges
remained. Thus, elections were seen as the best method of
selecting the jurists.
C.H. Warner, a Democrat from Colfax, moved to amend
the Committee's report and have two of the five justices
elected for three years and the remaining three elected for five
years.43 When two were to be elected, a voter could cast a bal-
lot for only one. If three were to be elected, the voter would
choose only two of them. Consequently, the minority Demo-
crats could salvage some representation on the new court.44
[Warner argued] that he had only one result in view in intro-
ducing this substitute, and that was the general good of the
future State of Washington. The principle of minority repre-
sentation... should always be considered, and especially so
in the judiciary. If such safeguards are thrown around the
judiciary as to keep it pure, and prevent politics from enter-
39. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 19, 1889, at 1, col. 4.
40. Seattle Daily Times, July 19, 1889, at 1, col. 4.
41. ROSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 5, at 597-98.
42. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 17, 1889, at 1, col. 6.
43. RosENow JOURNAL, supra note 5, at 600.
44. With the practice of voting a straight party ticket, which was encouraged by
the party list ballots, limiting the voters as suggested by Warner would permit
minority representation. This form of voting had been used to elect delegates to the
constitutional convention, accounting for the high number of Democrats (24). Seattle
Post-Intelligencer, July 19, 1889, at 1, col. 3.
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ing into the decisions, it would be for the advantage of the
whole people.45
The Republicans condemned the proposal as a crass polit-
ical move that would introduce political discord into the court's
deliberations. Dunbar feared such a plan would "curtail the
right of suffrage. Every man has a right to vote for the man of
his choice. .. 46 Judge Turner thought the proposal would
"introduce politics into the supreme court, something that
should never be done.""7 Republican E.H. Sullivan believed
that "to the victor belongs all the fruits of victory. '4' Another
Republican concurred: "[T]he majority should rule. He could
see no reason why the minority should be represented on the
bench. The voice of the people is the voice of God. They and
they alone have the right to say who shall administer their
laws." 49 Furthermore, argued several Republicans, minority
representation assured that the evil influence of partisan loyal-
ties would be felt among the members of the supreme court.
The Democrats defended the proposal. M.M. Goodman,
later an unsuccessful candidate for the supreme court, "depre-
cated the fact that politics had obtruded into the discussion.''50
Principle was most important. "[W]hat is right in principle and
best for the people at large"5 1 should be the issue. If the pro-
posal of his fellow Democrat Warner brought better men to
the bench, it ought to be adopted. 2 Others warned that one
day the Republicans might be the minority and without repre-
sentation on the court.5 3 However, the Republicans prevailed,
and the Warner proposal was rejected by a vote of forty-three
to twenty-four. The vote split along party lines.54
James Z. Moore, a Republican from Spokane Falls, pro-
posed that the state be separated into two judicial districts with
45. Seattle Daily Times, July 19, 1889, at 1, col. 4.
46. Id. at 1, col. 5.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id. D. Buchanan said "the voice of the people is the voice of God, but it is not
the voice of the rabble. It is, then, the voice of that great throng in Jerusalem who
cried out against Jesus. 'Crucify Him, crucify Him' was the voice of God. The same
rabble also sounded the voice of God a few days before when it strew flowers in His
path and cried, 'Hosanna, hosanna in the highest.'" Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 19,
1889, at 1, col. 6.
50. Seattle Daily Times, July 19, 1889, at 1, col. 5.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Id., cols. 5 & 6.
54. RoSENOW JOURNAL, sitpra note 5, at 600.
1989]
256 University of Puget Sound Law Review
two judges being elected from each district and the Chief Jus-
tice elected state-wide.55 This would allow the voters greater
knowledge of the bench. However, the view that citizens of
the state should vote for all of the judges ultimately
prevailed.'
Another proposal suggested that judicial elections be held
at a time different from the November general elections. This
proposal would remove judicial contests from the politics asso-
ciated with partisan campaigning. 7 The proposal was rejected,
however, largely for reasons of economy.' But, as a compro-
mise, the delegates permitted the legislature to change the
time for judicial elections should the solons regard it wise.59
The remaining article IV issues pertaining to the supreme
court involved jurisdictional and salary questions. The money
limit for appealing civil cases was placed at two-hundred dol-
lars.60 Several delegates urged removal of the dollar limit,
arguing that every citizen, however rich or poor, ought to have
a right to appeal to the supreme court.6 Dunbar disagreed,
pointing out that "rich men and corporations could oppress the
poor simply by appealing and making litigation so expensive
poor men would stop trying for their rights in court."62 Hoyt
moved to have the legislature establish the jurisdiction of the
court but his motion was defeated.63 The convention voted to
retain the two-hundred dollar constitutional restriction.'
The Judiciary Committee recommended that the supreme
court judges be paid five-thousand dollars.65 Some thought
that qualified lawyers could be attracted to the bench by a
three-thousand dollar salary. Others questioned this assertion,
arguing that "a competent lawyer can readily earn double the
amount of salary attached to the office of supreme judge,",
and that the only "way to have a judge above criticism, as to
capability, is to pay salaries commensurate with the talent
55. Id. at 602.
56. RoSENOW JOURNAL, supra note 5, at 601.
57. Id. at 602.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 604.
61. Id. at 605.
62. Id.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 604.




required."67 Hoyt, arguing for more flexibility, thought the
legislature should fix the salary, rather than placing a figure in
the constitution. After a prolonged debate dominated by con-
cerns for economy, the convention settled on a four-thousand
dollar salary. 8
On July 24th, 1889, the convention approved article IV by
a vote of sixty-seven to six.6 9 The entire constitution was
approved on August 22 and seventy-one of the seventy-five del-
egates affixed their signatures to the document.7 °
III. THE OCTOBER ELECTIONS TO THE STATE'S HIGH BENCH
Five days after the convention had completed its task, Ter-
ritorial Governor Miles Moore called for October 1 elections to
ratify the proposed constitution and, at the same time, to elect
state officials, including five supreme court judges. 1
Under the partisan system then in use, all candidates for
public office were nominated at their respective party conven-
tions.72 Republican delegates met in Walla Walla during the
first week in September and nominated Thomas J. Anders
(Walla Walla), Ralph Oregon Dunbar (Goldendale), John P.
Hoyt (Seattle), Elmon Scott (Pomeroy), and Theodore L. Stiles
(Tacoma) as the G.O.P.'s candidates for the supreme court.
Dunbar, Hoyt, and Stiles had been leading figures in the Con-
stitutional Convention.
Upon return from the Republican convention and with an
easy victory in sight, the G.O.P. candidates kept a low profile.
John Hoyt's stature alone largely excused him from speaking
out in partisan debates.73 He most often represented the
Republican candidates at the prominent rallies along with con-
67. Id., col. 2.
68. The Seattle Post-Intelligencer observed that the "idea of economy has become
paramount in the eyes of the convention, and a disposition not to spare the pruning
knife in cutting down expenses in all branches of government is evidenced in every
measure in which the question of expense is involved." Seattle Daily Times, July 20,
1889, at 1, col. 4. Earlier, Theodore Stiles had argued that economy was not the issue
"as the people of Washington had had enough of economy for the past 20 years."
Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 19, 1889, at 1, col. 5.
69. ROSENOW JouRNAL, supra note 5, at 629 (three Democrats and three
Republicans voted "Nay").
70. E. MEANY, HISTORY OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON 283 (1924) [hereinafter
MEANY].
71. Id.; WASH. CONST. art. IX, § 3.
72. Election laws, 1889 Wash. Laws 415.
73. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Sept. 16, 1889, at 1, col. 9.
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gressional aspirant John L. Wilson and gubernatorial candidate
Elisha Ferry.
The Democrats met in Ellensburg the next week and nom-
inated their slate for the high court. William H. White (who
would serve on the court in 1901), B. L. Sharpstein (a delegate
to the constitutional convention), John P. Judson, James B.
Reavis (who was elected to the high court in 1896), and Frank
Ganahl were selected by their fellow delegates to carry the
cause for the Democrats into the October elections.7 4
Even though they had argued for a nonpartisan bench in
the convention, the Democrats assumed a partisan stance in
the campaign. Former U.S. Attorney William White was the
most outspoken. For example, The Seattle Daily Times, most
often in support of the Republicans, reported that White "...
made one of his 'abusive' speeches. Mr. White makes no other
kind ... [Hie does not seem to have been affected with that
delicacy of respect for the high office to which he aspires, as
characterizes other candidates for judgeships."75 White had
been dubbed "War Horse" by both supporters and opponents
for his skill as a political debater.76 The Seattle Morning Jour-
nal revealed that Theodore Stiles had been "accused [while
practicing law in the Arizona Territory] of speculating with the
funds of the [Hudson and Co., bankers,] from which he accu-
mulated a considerable fortune with which he went to Wash-
ington."77 But the Seattle Daily Times labeled the accusations
as "mere political falsehoods" and a "malignant slander."' S A
telegram from leading citizens in Tucson pledging support for
Stiles did much to dispell the fears of the voters.79
John Hoyt also came under attack by the Democrats when
he was accused of favoritism toward the Northern Pacific Rail-
road while a territorial judge. He also was said to have denied
74. A CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 20, at 37.
75. Seattle Daily Times, Sept. 12, 1889, at 3, col. 2. The Seattle Post-Intelligencer
editorialized that "[t]he dignified attitude of the Republican nominees for judicial
positions is in pleasing contrast with that of their opponents. The intensely personal
harangues of "Bill" White will not win him many votes among the thinking people....
He is not the style of man that the people want on the supreme bench." Seattle Post-
Intelligencer, Sept. 16, 1889, at 1, col. 5.
76. C. REINHART, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE TERRITORY AND STATE
OF WASHINGTON 86 (n.d.); "In Memoriam," PROC. WA. ST. B. ASS'N 233 (1914).
77. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Sept. 18, 1889, at 1, col. 6.
78. Seattle Daily Times, Sept. 14, 1889, at 8, col. 1.
79. Id., Sept. 21, 1889, at 2, col. 3.
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the anti-Chinese rioters of 1886 the right of appeal."s The Seat-
tle Post-Intelligencer came to his defense and noted that every
attorney in Hoyt's twelve-county territorial district had signed
a petition for his reappointment as territorial judge."'
The tradition of voting a straight party ticket, which was
encouraged by the party list that permitted a voter to cast a
ballot for the entire party slate, led to a Republican landslide.8 2
Dunbar, Hoyt, Stiles, Anders, and Scott overwhelmed the
Democrats by nearly 10,000 votes, a significant margin in an
election of 55,000 ballots.8 3 The constitution also won over-
whelming approval; 40,152 votes for ratification and 11,879
against 4
All five of the original justices remained on the bench
until 1895, when Stiles was replaced by M.J. Gordon." Appar-
ently, Judge Stiles was a victim of his own political hesitation.
He had initially decided not to seek reelection and picked
Tacoma Superior Court Judge Pritchard as his successor. As
support for Pritchard waned just prior to the county G.O.P.
convention in August, 1894, Stiles reentered the race. This
split the Pierce County delegates, preventing them from agree-
ing on a candidate prior to the state convention in September. 6
Another factor was crucial in Stiles' loss. Delegations to the
state convention threatened that they would not support the
simultaneous renomination of both a supreme court judge and
a congressman, incumbent William H. Doolittle, from the same
county. This position reflected the belief that political offices
should be shared among the leading counties.87 Thus, the
Pierce County state delegation abandoned Stiles, threw their
support to Judge Merritt J. Gordon of Thurston County and
thereby assured themselves of the renomination of
80. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Sept. 28, 1889 at 4, col. 1.
81. Id.
82. The same party list voting was adopted by the first legislature. See 1889-90
Wash. Laws 410.
83. MEANY, supra note 70, at 287.
84. Id.
85. A CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 20, at 42.
86. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Sept. 16, 1894, at 8, col. 1.
87. The Tacoma Daily Ledger reported on the eve of the Republican convention
that: "Scalps are lying around a foot deep on the floor of Pierce County's . . .
headquarters.... The friends of Judges Stiles and Pritchard fought galantly to secure
their favorites the full 50 votes but without avail. It was decided to retire both of the
Pierce County aspirants for judicial honors and work solely and unremittingly for the
renomination of Congressman Doolittle as the only candidate of the delegation.
Tacoma Daily Ledger, Sept. 19, 1894, at 1, col. 3.
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Thomas J. Anders remained on the supreme court bench
until January of 1905, when he retired at the age of sixty-
seven. Judge Hoyt was the first incumbent to experience elec-
toral defeat when, in November 1896, he became the victim of
the People's Party sweep of state offices, losing to James B.
Reavis."9 He thereafter returned to Seattle to manage his
banking and business interests.90 Elmon Scott retired in 1899 to
practice law in Bellingham. Ralph Dunbar died in September
of 1912 while still serving on the court.91 This Article will ana-
lyze the period between 1889 and 1895, when all five members
of the inaugural court served together.
IV. PROFILES OF THE INAUGURAL MEMBERS OF THE
WASHINGTON SUPREME COURT
All of the victorious judges were experienced attorneys,
long active in Republican affairs. Thomas Jefferson Anders
was the eldest at fifty-one. In deference to his age, his col-
leagues selected him as the state's first Chief Justice. Anders
had arrived in Washington Territory in 1871, after graduating
from the University of Michigan law department and practic-
ing law in Wisconsin. Before his regal studies, he had taught
high school in Ohio. The need to regain his health prompted
Anders to travel west, first to Montana where he made a small
fortune in mining, and then to Walla Walla. He was regarded
as a legal scholar, although he had gained political prominence
earlier in his ten years of service as prosecuting attorney for
the Eastern Washington (Walla Walla) District. While in pri-
vate practice, he was elected for a two-year term as the Walla
Walla City Attorney.92
Unlike his fellow jurist, Anders, Ralph Oregon Dunbar
had lived in the west nearly all of his life. He had arrived in
the Willamette Valley in 1847, barely surviving the arduous
trek from St. Louis with his family. Among those who left St.
Louis with the Dunbars were members of the Donner party
who later perished when taking a different route over the
Sierra Nevada mountains. The Dunbars' party also encoun-
88. Id., Sept. 16, 1894, at 8, col. 1.
89. By 12,145 votes.
90. Seattle Post-Intelligencer, Dec. 28, 1980, (Northwest Magazine), at 14, col. 1.
91. A CENTURY OF JUDGING, Supra note 20, at 42.
92. Seattle Daily Times, Sept. 12, 1889, at 7, col. 1.
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tered adversity. An attack by Indians left members of the fam-
ily unharmed, but, except for one horse, all their livestock was
stolen in the raid. The one remaining horse was ridden by
Dunbar's mother, who carried the one-year-old Ralph in her
arms. His parents named him "Oregon" in celebration of their
safe arrival near Salem.
Dunbar attended Willamette College and stayed on to
teach for two years. In 1867 he studied law under territorial
Judge Elwood Evans. Immediately after he was admitted to
the Washington bar in 1869, Dunbar clerked for Justice Orange
Jacobs of the Territorial Supreme Court. Later, Dunbar
returned to Salem and then set up practice in Yakima (1871),
then The Dalles (1875), and finally in Goldendale (1877) on the
Washington side of the Columbia River. He was elected to the
Upper House of the Territorial Council in 1878; served in
Goldendale as prosecuting attorney for one term; and later,
served as Goldendale's City Attorney. Dunbar was elected
Speaker of the Territorial Lower House in 1885. He was also
publisher and editor of the Goldendale Sentinel, a paper
known for its unwavering support of Republican causes. Dun-
bar was elected as a delegate to the 1889 Washington Constitu-
tional Convention and was largely responsible for the
constitutional article on school lands. He had earnestly desired
to be Washington's first congressman but lost at the Republi-
can convention to John L. Wilson by three votes.
Dunbar was charming, witty, and persuasive, but firm, if
not stubborn. He was known as a master storyteller. His con-
temporaries viewed him as a "safe conservator of society,"
holding a proper check on "radicalism and iconoclasm."93
A third jurist, John P. Hoyt, was elected at forty-eight
years of age and possessed impressive credentials. He was born
in Ohio, raised on a farm, and educated in public schools as
well as the Grand River Institute in Austinburg, Ohio. After
teaching school for a short period, he volunteered for the
Union Army, serving four years. Upon discharge from the
army, Hoyt attended Ohio State University and then Union
Law School in Cleveland, graduating in 1867. He began his
93. Dunbar and Hoyt were in serious contention for the honor of being presiding
officer of the convention. However, their strong support for the women's vote was a
hindrance. According to The Seattle Daily Times: "Hoyt is objected to by the anti-
suffragists, but his views upon the subject are mild, compared with those of Dunbar,
consequently Dunbar's changes for the coveted honor have melted away like snow in
the sunshine." Seattle Daily Times, July 3, 1889, at 1, col. 4.
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legal and political careers in Michigan; first as a prosecuting
attorney for Tuiscola County, then; as a member, and later as
speaker, of the Michigan House of Representatives. President
Grant appointed him as Secretary of the Territory of Arizona
and later as Governor of the Territory in 1877. Hoyt later
turned down an appointment as Governor of Idaho Territory
but accepted a position on the Washington Territorial Supreme
Court instead, serving from 1879 to 1887. He became active in
banking affairs after finishing his term on the territorial court
and later entered into several successful real estate ventures.
The politics of statehood brought Hoyt back into public life
and he was elected President of the 1889 Washington Constitu-
tional Convention.
A fourth member of first supreme court, Theodore
Lamme Stiles was forty-one years old when elected to the
bench. He had graduated from the law department of Colum-
bia College in 1872 after earning a classics degree from
Amherst College in Massachusetts. He began his law practice
in Indiana, but soon returned to New York City to associate
with the law firm of Jordan and Thompson. He eventually
was drawn by the opportunities available in the west and
moved to Tucson and finally to Tacoma in 1887.
Stiles was immediately attracted to local Republican poli-
tics and was selected as a delegate to the Constitutional Con-
vention, serving as chairman on the County, Township, and
Municipal Organizations Committee. He was elected perma-
nent chairman of the Republican Nominating Convention.
After retirement from the court, Stiles practiced law in
Tacoma, served as Tacoma City Attorney and President of the
Washington State Bar Association, and became known as the
"Dean of the Tacoma Bar."
At thirty-six, Elmon Scott was the youngest member of
the first supreme court. He had read law in Michigan and
served as a city attorney for a short time. In the spirit of
adventure, he joined a wagon train that was headed west. He
worked on a farm in Boise and drove an ox team to Walla
Walla. Upon hearing of a cousin in Pomeroy, Washington,
Scott moved there in 1882 to open up a law office. Although a
staunch Republican, his sole political experience was three
terms as Mayor of Pomeroy.
All five of the jurists possessed identical partisan identi-
ties. Their social backgrounds and legal and political exper-
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iences, however rich, were not especially diverse. The results
of the Republican-dominated October 1889 elections brought
them together within the confines of the decisional procedures
of the state's high bench.
V. THE DECISIONAL STYLE OF THE FIRST SUPREME COURT
The decisional process by which the five jurists resolved
the disputes before them involved both individual and collec-
tive elements. The decisional process was a product of their
knowledge of the territorial benches, their experience from
other state judiciaries, the dictates of personal habit, and their
desire to encourage a fruitful and efficient interchange among
themselves.
The weekly briefs filed by attorneys were reviewed by
each judge prior to oral arguments. Monday through Thursday
was usually devoted to the attorneys' oral presentations. A
number of disputes were decided solely on the briefs. At the
end of each week, the judges, in a closed conference, gave col-
lective attention to the cases heard that week. Discussions,
and occasionally debates, culminated in tentative votes on the
disposition of the cases. Opinion-drafting responsibilities were
assigned "to several of the judges in rotation." These assign-
ments were made without reference to the subject matter or
consideration of the preferences of the litigants or the judges.
Each judge was to receive an equal number of assigned cases
and would assume sole responsibility for researching his
assignments.94
On those rare occasions when the conference discussions
left an issue unresolved, the assigned judge reviewed the rec-
ord further and consulted informally with his brethren.95 If
dissension remained, each judge went back to the record and
consulted with others. Finally, if the assigned judge failed to
hold a majority, the court's opinion was given to the member
of the new majority- the group that had initially expressed
misgivings. Any dissenter was free to draft an opinion or sim-
ply dissent without opinion. Concurring in the results only was
not an uncommon response. 96
Petitions for rehearing were commonly filed but rarely
94. Rudkin, The Court's Work, PROC. WA. ST. B. ASS'N 170 (1906).
95. Id.
96. Id. at 171.
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granted.97 However, if any member of the court felt that fur-
ther consideration was appropriate, he discussed his misgivings
with the other judges. If a majority was convinced that
another look at the issue was appropriate, the petition was
granted.98 However, a short opinion denied the petition and
closed the matter under usual circumstances. 99
In contrast with the modern court,100 court opinions were
numerous and brief. Dissenting opinions were rare. Heavy
reliance was placed on the oral arguments, and informal con-
sultations were encouraged.0 1
The decisional process was designed both to promote the
exchange of ideas among the judges and to encourage agree-
ment among the bench. Ideally, five diverse approaches would
be melded into a unanimous resolution of the issues presented.
The members of the first supreme court had similar views of
law and politics, and shared the experience of drafting the
state constitution. One would expect a high level of agreement
among such a group.
VI. JUDICIAL REVIEW AND THE FIRST COURT
Each judge brought to the high bench his characteristic set
of attitudes nurtured by a not-altogether-unique background
and training. The inaugural members, all Republicans, had a
common political perspective. They were placed together in a
decisional framework that encouraged a majority to agree on
often contentious and complicated legal issues. These issues
had serious public policy implications and placed a heavy bur-
den on the jurists' shared perspective. This was especially evi-
dent when issues involving constitutional provisions were at
bar.
Courts of justice engage in delicate balancing when they
invoke the constitution in settling legal disputes. Occasionally,
judges must refer to the fundamental law to check the
excesses of the policy-making bodies of the government. How-
ever, judicial review also raises the possibility that the judges
will substitute their view of what is best for the community for
97. Id. at 173.
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. A CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 20, at 250.
101. For an analysis of the modern court, see Sheldon, An Interpretation of the
Judicial Process: The Washington Supreme Court as a Small Group, 13 GONZ. L. REV.
97 (1977).
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that of the elected representatives of the people. Restraint,
therefore, must be part of the judicial formula.10 2
Before Washington became a state, judicial review of legis-
lative acts was well established. The Washington Territorial
Supreme Court had invalidated legislation several times.10 3 By
the time the constitution was ratified, no one challenged the
court's power to check the legislative and executive branches
through judicial review. A few years after statehood, Judge
Stiles expressed the prevailing view:
The courts are, and in the nature of things, must be the
appellate body, and their power to review extends over the
entire domain of public and private right. Once it is con-
ceded, as it is now, universally, that a statute may be
declared void as unconstitutional, there is no denying the
proposition of judicial supremacy. Whenever the legislature
enacts a law it thereby assumes and asserts it is constitu-
tional; and whenever the court declares the contrary, the
judgment of the court prevails, and there is no power except
that of the people in constitutional convention that can
reverse it.1°4
Although not as controversial as the oversight of legislative
acts, courts also reviewed the constitutional validity of execu-
tive actions, county and city ordinances, and the practices of
lower courts.
Because judicial review permits courts to be equal if not
leading actors in the governing process, the practice is an ideal
source for political analysis. The opinions of judges, in those
cases that have compelled them to contemplate the nature and
wording of the fundamental law, are likely to provide insight
into the relations among the judges and to illuminate their rel-
ative effectiveness. For example, were the disagreements
among the judges more pronounced in constitutional cases?
Also, was one judge most effective in cases involving judicial
review?
The incidence of judicial review between 1890 and 1895
102. See S. HALPERN & C. LAMB, SUPREME COURT ACTIVISM AND RESTRAINT
(1982).
103. For example, Dacres v. Oregon R.R. Navigation Co., 1 Wash. 525, 20 P. 601
(1890). The Territorial Supreme Court exercised judicial review at least a dozen times
and invalidated six legislative acts.




was similar to subsequent years.1 °5 Table 1 illustrates the
number of cases involving judicial review and the number of
statutes or ordinances declared unconstitutional.
TABLE 1
INCIDENCE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW' ° 6
Number of Cases Number
Involving Judicial Declared
Year Review Percent Unconstitutional Percent
1890 12 (100) 12% 3 25%
1891 13 (186) 7% 2 15%
1892 9 (314) 3% 2 22%
1893 15 (354) 4% 4 27%
1894 14 (391) 4% 4 29%
1895* 0 ( 37) 0% 0 0%
Totals 63 (1382) 4.6% 15 24%
* From January 1 to January 14, 1895 when Stiles still participated.
During the court's first year in operation, the judges were
confronted with constitutional issues in nearly one out of eight
cases. This ratio dropped considerably and leveled off at
approximately one out of thirty cases by 1895. One would
think that most of the issues in 1890 would result from the
transition from organic law, under the territorial system, to
the new constitution. However, all territorial laws not specifi-
cally replaced or revised by the state constitution or legisla-
ture, and all relevant territorial court rulings, remained in
force. This discouraged conflicts between the state constitution
and organic law. The court was called upon to interpret some
of the territorial laws, °7 but such questions rarely required a
choice between the territorial organic law and the state consti-
tution. A large number of the cases involved the taxing pow-
ers and indebtedness of local governments. 0 8
Despite the relatively modest exercise of judicial review,
105. See Judicial Review, supra note 12.
106. Only those cases involving a constitutional (U.S. as well as state) challenge to
a legislative enactment, an ordinance (county, city, town, special districts), or an
executive action based on a statute were tabulated. These presented the greatest
challenge to judicial authority. Some criminal cases and those questioning court
procedure were often challenged on the basis of "due process" but not tabulated
because these were the sort of questions that courts would ordinarily resolve without
presenting a threat to the prerogatives of the executive or the legislature.
107. Ah Lin v. Territory of Washington, 1 Wash. 156, 24 P. 588 (1890).
108. Metcalfe v. City of Seattle, 1 Wash. 297, 25 P. 1010 (1890).
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in approximately twenty-four percent of all judicial review
cases, or sixteen out of sixty-three, legislation was invali-
dated.1" 9 This rate of invalidation continued throughout the
five years under consideration.
The judges' judicial review behavior presents a paradox.
On the one hand, the judges were provided with limited oppor-
tunities to intervene in the governing process; on the other
hand, they were not reluctant to strike down legislation if it
appeared inconsistent with the constitution. Was the court
best characterized as activist or restraintist? Comparisons
with the numbers compiled by other courts in other times fail
to provide the answer because the case context would be miss-
ing. The issue must be resolved by the decisions themselves.
What were the judges' views of their role in the governing pro-
cess? Had they accepted Judge Stiles' perspective, or was he
109. 1890 cases in which a law was declared unconstitutional: Kelly v. Stewart, 1
Wash. 98, 23 P. 405 (1890); Oregon Ry. & Navig. Co. v. Dacres, 1 Wash. 195, 23 P. 415
(1890); Oregon Ry. & Navig. Co. v. Smalley, 1 Wash. 206, 23 P. 1008 (1890). Cases in
which the jurists exercised judicial review but found the law adequate: Ah Lirn v.
Territory, 1 Wash. 156, 24 P. 588 (1890); Van Houten v. Routhe, 1 Wash. 306, 25 P. 728
(1890); Yesler v. Seattle, 1 Wash. 308, 25 P. 1014 (1890); Tacoma Land Co. v. Board of
County Comm'r, 1 Wash. 482, 25 P. 904 (1890); Board of Comm'r v. Davies, 1 Wash. 290,
24 P. 540 (1890); In re Rafferty, 1 Wash. 382, 25 P. 465 (1890); Hickman v. Hickman, 1
Wash. 257, 24 P. 445 (1890); Metcalfe v. Seattle, 1 Wash. 297, 25 P. 1010 (1890).
1891 cases declaring laws unconstitutional: In re Cloherty, 2 Wash. 137, 27 P. 1064
(1891); Wilson v. Seattle, 2 Wash. 543, 27 P. 474 (1891). Other judicial review cases:
State v. Spokane, 2 Wash. 40, 25 P. 903 (1891); Alger v. Hill, 2 Wash. 344, 27 P. 922
(1891); Bellingham Bay Ry. & Navigation Co. v. Loose, 2 Wash. 500, 27 P. 174 (1891);
Lybarger v. State, 2 Wash. 522, 22 P. 449 (1891); Baker v. Seattle, 2 Wash. 576, 27 P. 462
(1891); In re Lybarger, 2 Wash. 131, 25 P. 1075 (1891); Eisenbach v. Hatfield, 2 Wash.
236, 26 P. 539 (1891).
1892 cases declaring laws or ordinances unconstitutional: State ex reL Dyer v.
Twichell, 4 Wash. 715, 31 P. 19; (1892); State er reL Snell v. Warner, 4 Wash. 715, 31 P.
19 (1892). Other judicial review cases: State v. Womack, 4 Wash. 19, 29 P. 939 (1892);
State ex reL Wiesenthal v. Denny, 4 Wash. 135, 29 P. 991 (1892); Board of Directors v.
Peterson, 4 Wash. 147, 29 P. 995 (1892); State v. Carey, 4 Wash. 424, 30 P. 729 (1892);
Wilson v. Beyers, 5 Wash. 303, 32 P. 90 (1892); State v. Anderson, 5 Wash. 350, 31 P. 969
(1892); DeMattos v. New Whatcom, 4 Wash. 127, 29 P. 933 (1892).
1893 cases declaring laws unconstitutional: McMurray v. Hollis, 5 Wash. 458, 32 P.
293 (1893); Peterson v. Smith, 6 Wash. 163, 32 P. 1050 (1893); State ex reL Baldwin v.
Moore, 7 Wash. 173, 34 P. 461 (1893); Denver v. Spokane Falls, 7 Wash. 226, 34 P. 926
(1893). Other judicial review cases: Lewis v. Seattle, 5 Wash. 741, 32 P. 794 (1893);
Pacific Mfg. Co. v. School Dist., 6 Wash. 121, 33 P. 68 (1893); Seymour v. Tacoma, 6
Wash. 138, 32 P. 1077 (1893); State ex rel. Seattle v. Carson, 6 Wash. 250, 33 P. 428
(1893); Germond v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 365, 33 P. 961 (1893); State ex rel. Reed v. Jones, 6
Wash. 453, 34 P. 201 (1893); Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. Co. v. Chilberg, 6 Wash. 612,
34 P. 163 (1893); Heilig v. City Council of Puyallup, 7 Wash. 29, 34 P. 164 (1893);
Romine v. State, 7 Wash. 215, 34 P. 924 (1893); State ex rel. School Dist. of Snohomish
County v. Grimes, 7 Wash. 270, 34 P. 836 (1893); State ex reL Thurston County v.
Grimes, 7 Wash 445, 35 P. 361 (1893).
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largely speaking for himself when he spoke of "judicial
supremacy?"
Judge Hoyt expressed"' the classical version of judicial
restraint:
When any question involving the constitutionality of an act
of the legislature is presented to a court for adjudication, it
calls for the utmost care and consideration of such a court in
determining the same, and if this is true in an ordinary case,
it is much more so in the one at bar, which presents a ques-
tion of public policy of the gravest nature; one in fact upon
which depends to a great extent on the prosperity of a very
considerable portion of the inhabitants of the state.""
In contrast, Judge Scott was not the least bit hesitant to void a
law when, in his view, it ran counter to the constitution. In a
dissent," 2 he angrily took the majority to task for not being
active:
There must be a right of review or control, to some extent,
in the courts. Each citizen is entitled to the protection of all
the branches of government. A declaration by the legisla-
ture as to what the law shall be, is not necessarily a conclu-
sion reached by the state. The legislature is not the state,
although a very important or essential part of it .... [The
courts] are at liberty-indeed are under a solemn duty-to
look at the substance of things, whenever they enter upon
the inquiry whether the legislature has transcended the lim-
its of its authority.113
In reviewing the sixty-three cases in which judicial review
was exercised, a clear indication of which of the judges
accepted Hoyt's or Scott's view may be gleaned.
Table 2 reports the degree of activism, i.e., declaring laws
unconstitutional, exercised by each of the judges.
110. Board of Directors v. Peterson, 4 Wash. 147, 29 P. 995 (1892).
111. Id. at 148, 29 P. at 995.
112. Ah irm v. Territory, 1 Wash. 156, 24 P. 588 (1890).
113. Id. at 178, 24 P. at 592.
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TABLE 2
RATE OF JUDICIAL ACTIVISM
Percent of Percent of
No. Majority Jud. Rev. Number Invalidating
Opinions with Opinions Declaring Laws Opinions
Judge Judicial Review Authored Unconstitutional Authored
Stiles 20 32% 5 33%
Hoyt 14 22% 3 20%
Anders 7 11% 3 20%
Scott 9 14% 2 13%
Dunbar 13 21% 2 13%
Totals 63 100% 15 99%
Judge Stiles' record clearly reflects the most activist per-
spective among the five judges. Judge Dunbar was most reluc-
tant to strike down legislation. Judge Stiles was the
workhorse in constitutional cases. Although the assignments
were supposed to be randomly awarded, he tended to write for
the court in constitutional issues involving municipalities and
city charters. He had been chairman of the constitutional con-
vention's Committee on County, Township, and Municipal
Organization. He was not only an authority on the subject, he
was the "founding father" of article XI.
A review of several cases in which Judge Stiles' and Dun-
bar's views conflict is instructive regarding the early court's
attitude toward the role of judicial review in the governing
process. The first cases involving the court's review of a legis-
lative act hinted at Judge Dunbar's restraintist perspective. In
Territory ex rel. Kelly v. Stewart,"' Chief Justice Anders, writ-
ing for the court, struck down an act permitting a district judge
to validate signatures on a petition for the incorporation of a
town. He held that "a judicial court cannot exercise legislative
functions and.., the legislature cannot impose such power on
them.1 1 Judge Dunbar concurred in the result but could not
"concur in the opinion that the act of the legislature was
unconstitutional." '1 1 6 He did not explain an alternative theory
that would reach the same results.
In Parmeter v. Bourne,'1 7 Judges Stiles and Dunbar con-
fronted an issue that divided them throughout. The case
114. 1 Wash. 98, 23 P. 405 (1890).
115. Id. at 170, 23 P. at 408.
116. Id.
117. 8 Wash. 45, 35 P. 586 (1894) (dissent reported separately in 35 P. 757).
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involved the question of whether an election to remove a
county seat was a "political question," and thus, beyond the
concern of the court. Dunbar argued that the issue was non-
justiciable because:
This decision was based upon the theory that the legislature
was one of the coordinate departments of the government,
with equal authority with the others, and that the assump-
tion is a false one, that the 'mandatory provisions of the con-
stitution are safer if the enforcement thereof is entrusted to
the judicial department than if so entrusted to the
legislature'. .. .118
Judge Stiles, as might be expected, expressed a different view
in his dissent:
The term "political question" has been made, in the opinion
of the court deciding this case, to perform a very large and
imposing, but, it seems to me, at the same time, misleading
part. I think it is a shadow without substance.... In my
judgment, the only question which a court, with the allega-
tions of this complaint before it, should consider, is, what is
the proper remedy? To refuse any relief because the legisla-
ture has failed to make a complete election law, is to nullify
the constitutional right of each elector to vote and to have
his ballot counted." 9
Like the United States Supreme Court in federalism
cases, 120 the five judges rarely were reluctant to review county
and municipal ordinances. But congressional acts generated
debate. Even activists would often explain that they were"constrained" to hold the statute invalid121 or that they should
not "embarrass" their legislative counterparts. 122
The judicial review cases drawn from the first five years of
the supreme court suggest generally a restraintist bench con-
cerned for its role in the separation of powers scheme. The
activist Stiles, however mild, tended to lose to the restraintists,
118. Id. at 56-57, 35 P. at 590 (in part quoting State ex rel. Reed v. Jones, 6 Wash.
452, 34 P. 201 (1893).
119. Id. at 58, 65, 35 P. at 757, 759.
120. Since Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810), the Supreme Court has
invalidated state legislation with impunity. Nearly a thousand (970) state laws and
state constitutional provisions have been declared unconstitutional. H. ABRAHAM, THE
JUDICIAL PRocEss 293 (1986).
121. E.g., Territory ex rel. Kelly v. Stewart, 1 Wash. 98, 110 23 P. 405 (1890).
122. E.g., Seymour v. Tacoma, 6 Wash. 138, 149, 32 P. 1077 (1893).
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Scott and Dunbar, and the moderates, Anders and Hoyt, who
provided balance in close cases.
However, judicial review cases constituted but a portion of
the court's calendar. Constitutional cases might be considered
the most important disputes before the judges, but an analysis
of their opinions and votes in nonconstitutional cases can
reveal much about the political and legal relations among the
jurists.
VII. DECISIONAL RELATIONS AMONG THE JUSTICES
To enhance our understanding of the nature of the rela-
tionships among the five judges,12 this Article will analyze two
aspects of judicial interaction. First, the level of agreement
among the members of the bench will be isolated. It is
expected that the shared backgrounds and politics should
encourage a high level of agreement. Second, the effectiveness
of each of the five jurists will be determined. It might be
assumed that if a high level of agreement is lacking, variance
in judicial effectiveness likely exists.
The data base is the compilation of the 1,382 cases heard
by the court between 1890, the first year of the court, and 1895,
when Judge Stiles was replaced by Judge M.J. Gordon. The
source is the Washington Reports and the method is simply to"count" the votes and opinion-writing responsibilities in each
of those cases. Ten volumes of the Reports are involved with
an average of 139 cases reported in each volume. In its first
year the court decided 100 cases, and in 1894 the court decided
396. Eighty-six percent of the 1,382 decisions were unanimous
and fifteen percent (203) involved a dissenting opinion.124
A. Patterns of Agreement
This Article's concern, however, is not primarily with the
court as a whole but rather with each of the judges as they
worked with each other to render decisions. How was the
workload distributed among the judges? Given the procedures
involved in the decisional process, each judge should have been
123. For such a social analysis of other periods of the Washington Supreme Court,
see Note, The Washington Supreme Court What It Was Like Thirty Years Ago, 19
GONz. L. REV. 231 (1983/84); S. ULMER, COURTS AS SMALL AND NOT SO SMALL GRouPS
(1971).
124. These figures were not altogether different from other courts. See A
CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 20.
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responsible for 274 decisions within the same five-year time
period (1890-1895). But as Table 3 reports, the tasks were far
from evenly distributed.
TABLE 3
DISTRIBUTION OF OPINION ASSIGNMENTS AMONG
JUDGES
Number Percent of
Majority "Not Absences from
Judges Opinions Percent Sitting" all Cases
Stiles 335 24.5% 20 1.5%
Hoyt 312 22.8% 55 4.0%
Dunbar 283 20.7% 71 5.2%
Scott 257 18.8% 54 3.9%
Anders 181 13.2% 136 9.9%
(per curiam = 14)
Court average 274 20.0% 67 4.8%
Both Judges Stiles and Hoyt wrote more than an equal
share of opinions for the court. Judges Scott and Anders wrote
the fewest. In Anders' case, an explanation can be found in his
many absences from the bench. For whatever reasons, he and
Judge Dunbar did not sign the final version of some of the
court's opinions and, thus, did not assume their full share of
the assignments. Dunbar's name was missing from 71 of the
opinions (5.2%) and Anders' from 136 (9.9%). Stiles missed
twenty (1.5%), and Scott and Hoyt did not sit on fifty-four
(3.9%) and fifty-five (4.0%) of the cases, respectively.
Various reasons may explain the absence of a judge's name
on an opinion. If a judge disagreed with an opinion he could
record his dissent by simply stating, "I Dissent," without expla-
nation. Or, he could simply leave his name off the opinion. On
the other hand, illness, unavailability, conflicts of interest, or
other court business could have kept the judge from participat-
ing in the case.12 5 Also, both Anders and Dunbar served a two-
year term as Chief Justice. Perhaps ceremonial and adminis-
125. In only a few cases when a judge was missing did the Reports record a
"disqualified." It was noted as either "not sitting" or the judge's name (signature) was
simply missing. Richard F. Jones, reporter for decisions for the Washington Reports
for over 20 years, attached little significance to the absences. He stated that "the
judges whose names are not listed as participating in the decision simply were not
present at the time of the argument or were not available for signing the opinion." A
CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 20, at 258.
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trative duties kept them out of the regular opinion assignment
sequence. In the area of authorship, however, the figures indi-
cate that Judge Stiles was the workhorse of the court, account-
ing for one-fourth of the majority opinions.
The uneven distribution of the court's opinion assignments
may have been related to the patterns of agreement among the
judges. For example, Judge Anders' low majority assignments
might have been caused by his dissenting from many of the
court's opinions. Table 4 records the dissonance level (dissent-
ing and separate concurring opinions and votes) on the inaugu-
ral bench.126 As Table 4 reports, disagreement also was not






Dissenting Dissenting Number of Total
Judges Opinions Votes Concurrences* Number Percent**
Hoyt 65 69 52 186 14.0%
Dunbar 69 55 45 169 12.9%
Stiles 44 23 47 113 8.3%
Scott 20 44 45 109 8.2%
Anders 5 28 36 69 5.5%
Court Averages 41 44 45 129 9.8%
* Concurring votes and opinions.
** Total of dissents and concurrences divided by the number of cases on which the
judge sat.
Judges Hoyt and Dunbar recorded the highest level of dis-
sonance on the bench, disagreeing in the results (dissenting) or
in the reasons for the results (concurring) in nearly one-eighth
of the cases in which they participated. Judges Scott and Stiles
parted from the majority in only eight percent of the decisions.
Judge Anders' lower level of participation as noted in Table 2
was not caused by his recorded departures from the majority,
because he -rarely filed a dissent or a concurring opinion or
vote.
As noted earlier, 2 ' the court's deliberations involved both
126. For further applications of the "dissonance" measure, see id. at 246-51.
Dissenting behavior is ably analyzed in JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS:
BEHAVIORAL STUDIES OF AMERICAN APPELLATE COURTS (Goldman & Lamb eds., 1986).
127. See supra text accompanying notes 95-102.
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individual and collective stages. The judges contemplated
briefs filed by the attorneys, heard oral arguments, and drafted
their opinions individually. They exchanged viewpoints
through conferences, informal consultations, and debates in
order to achieve a majority agreement. When the results of
the individual clashed with those of the collective bench, disso-
nance resulted. Judge Hoyt's separate preferences kept him
from joining the majority more than the other judges, while
Judge Anders reached agreement with the majority more
often than his brethren.
The dissonance data indicates that Judges Scott and
Anders had higher levels of agreement with their brethren.
With which judges did they most often agree? Table 5 records
the percentage of agreements between pairs of judges. 2 '
TABLE 5
AGREEMENT PERCENTAGE BETWEEN JUDGES
REGARDING DECISION RESULTS
Judges Stiles Scott Dunbar Hoyt
Anders 89.8% 87.8% 83.8% 81.6%
Stiles 84.2% 80.7% 81.9%
Scott 83.8% 81.5%
Dunbar 73.6%
Court Average = 83.1%
In all cases brought before the court, including petitions
for rehearings that resulted in a court response, Judges Stiles
and Anders (89.8%), Scott and Anders (89.8%), and Scott and
Stiles (87.8%) tended to join one another. In contrast, Judges
Hoyt and Dunbar (73.6%) tended to disagree significantly with
each other.129 As might be expected, the average percentage of
agreement for each judge follows closely the ranking for disso-
nance reported in Table 4. Judge Anders garnered an average
128. Ordinarily, interagreement scales are referred to as "bloc analysis." See
generally G. SCHUBERT, QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR (1959);
Ulmer, Toward a Theory of Sub-groups Formation in the United States Supreme
Court, 27 J. POL. 133 (1965); W. MURPHY & J. TANNENHAUS, THE STUDY OF PUBLIC
LAW (1972); JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND CONSENSUS, (S. Goldman & C. Lamb eds. 1986).
129. Sprague has arrived at a "significance level" for interagreement scales by
subtracting the court interagreement average (83.1%) from 100% (16.9%), dividing this
in half (8.45%) and adding this to the court average (91.2%), or subtracting it (75.0%).
Any interagreement above 91.2% or below 75% is regarded as statistically significant.
See J. SPRAGUE, VOTING PATTERNS OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: CASES IN
FEDERALISM, 1889-1959, at 54 (1968).
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of 85.8% agreement with his colleagues; Judges Stiles (84.2%),
Scott (84.3%), and Dunbar (80.5%). The differences among the
judges were slight, but Judge Hoyt was in agreement with his
colleagues the least (79.7%). Considering that all the judges
were Republicans, and many of them had been active in parti-
san affairs, it is surprising that the levels of agreement were
not higher.
The interaction data suggest that Judge Anders was not as
active a participant in the court's deliberations as might have
been expected. He was absent from nearly ten percent of the
cases heard by the court in the five years under study. He
rarely dissented or concurred separately. However, when he
did participate, he recorded a high level of agreement with all
of his colleagues, especially with Stiles and Scott. Judges Dun-
bar and Hoyt were occasionally at odds with the other mem-
bers, and, interestingly, were significantly in disagreement
with each other. Perhaps some sense can be made of these
relationships by attempting various measures of effectiveness
for each of the judges. Political partisanship failed to hold the
five together. Perhaps some of the jurists were more effective
in achieving the goals of the court or in pursuing their own
agendas.
B. Effectivness on the Inaugural Bench
Effectiveness, of course, is multi-faceted.130 For example,
one judge may provide expertise in certain areas of the law.
Another may be a persuasive and convincing conference par-
ticipant or an effective opinion writer. Another may be a
social leader, providing the requisite atmosphere for delibera-
tions. A Chief Justice may add to the effectiveness of the court
by virtue of the responsibilities surrounding the office. To
measure effectiveness or indications of effectiveness, then,
requires a variety of computations. Nonetheless, some judges
emerge as more effective when evaluated under the various
criteria.
The question generated by the figures concerning inter-
130. A number of studies have measured leadership and effectiveness on state
courts. Eg., C. DUCAT & V. FLANGO, LEADERSHIP IN STATE SUPREME COURTS: ROLES
OF THE CHIEF JUSTICE (1976); Flango, Ducat & McKnight, Measuring Leadership
Through Opinion Assignments in Two State Supreme Courts, JUDICIAL CONFLICT AND
CONSENSUS 215 (Goldman & Lamb eds. 1986); McConkie, Decision-Making in State
Supreme Courts, 59 JUDICATURE 343 (1976); Ulmer, Leadership in the Michigan
Supreme Court, JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 16 (Schubert ed. 1963).
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agreement rates reported in Table 5 concerns the most effec-
tive judge in the pairs reported. For example, in the pair of
Anders and Stiles, who agreed nearly ninety percent of the
time, which judge tended to provide effective leadership? By
comparing the number of times Anders agreed with Stiles
when Stiles wrote an opinion with the number of times Stiles
agreed with Anders when Anders wrote, a measure of effec-
tiveness-at least between those two considered-is possible.




Writing Agreeing Leader/Follower Average Leader/
Judge Judge Ratio Follower Ratio
DUNBAR -> Anders 93/82 Dunbar 90/83
DUNBAR -> Scott 93/86
DUNBAR -> Stiles 91/84
DUNBAR ---- > Hoyt 84/81
HOYT ----- > Anders 92/81 Hoyt 88/82
HOYT .... > Scott 95/79
Hoyt <--- STILES 82/90
Stiles <------ SCOTT 83/86 Stiles 88/87
STILES .... > Anders 96/88
SCOTT ----- > Anders 92/87 Scott 86/90
Anders 85/93
Whenever Judge Dunbar wrote, he garnered more support
from the other judges than he provided them when they wrote.
Judge Hoyt held sway in two relationships (Anders and Scott),
but was influenced by Stiles and Dunbar. Judge Anders,
despite his high interagreement score reported in Table 5,
failed effectively to sway any of his colleagues over to his
opinion.
Another perspective of the relationships between and
among the judges concerning effectivness is presented when
data are gathered on the number of votes each judge received
when he wrote an opinion, either majority, concurring, or dis-
senting.13 1 When a particular judge wrote the opinion for the
court, he would be expected to have enough commitment to
131. Sheldon, An Interpretation of the Judicial Process: The Washington
Supreme Court as a Small Group, 13 GONZ. L. REv. 97, 117 (1977).
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attempt to reach unanimity among his brethren. The deci-
sional process described earlier was designed to reach unani-
mous agreement through formal and informal consultation. At
the same time, a dissenter might be expected to attempt to
gain enough votes to create a majority. Likely, then, the more
persuasive judge would win more of his colleague's votes, and
consequently be more effective. Table 7 reports the vote-gain-
ing skills of the jurists.
TABLE 7
AVERAGE VOTES PER OPINION
Average
Opinions Number of Number of
Judges Written* Votes Votes/Opinion
Dunbar 300 1273 4.24
Hoyt 330 1394 4.22
Anders 200 796 3.98
Scott 280 1113 3.98
Stiles 365 1446 3.96
Court average = 295 1204 4.08
= Majority, concurring and dissenting opinions.
Judges Dunbar and Hoyt apparently were more convincing
when writing an opinion than were Judges Scott or Stiles.
When Judge Dunbar wrote and all members of the bench were
present, he garnered an average of 4.24 votes for his opinions.
Judge Hoyt's average was 4.22; Anders' and Scott's, 3.98; and
Stiles', 3.96.
How could Judge Anders fail to dominate any of his col-
leagues, as reported in Table 6, but still equal the voting sup-
port of Scott and Stiles as depicted in Table 7? This occurred
through avoiding dissents. Because Anders wrote so few dis-
senting (five) and concurring (twelve) opinions which could
have garnered a maximum of two votes in a five-member
court, he raised his vote support record above or equal to his.
colleagues who dissented or concurred separately more often.
Although effectiveness may not always be felt immedi-
ately on the bench and among the judges, the clarity, thor-
oughness and anticipatory value of an opinion may transcend
the moment and become a leading precedent for future cases.
For example, the great dissenter on the United States Supreme
Court, the elder Justice John Marshall Harlan, anticipated a
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number of future decisions and many of his dissents were
eventually vindicated. 132 Effectiveness of this kind can be
roughly measured by following the number of positive citations
to a particular case in subsequent decisions of a court reported
in Shepard's Washington Citations.3 3 As recorded in Table 8,
Judge Anders received an average of 7.7 citations per opinion
between 1890 and 1982. Judge Hoyt, on the other hand,
received 4.7 cites per opinion. Apparently, Judge Anders left
the heaviest mark on the state's legal history. Judge Hoyt was
apparently the least influential. Judges Stiles and Scott were
average for the five judges and Judge Dunbar also contributed











The position of Chief Justice may have also had its respon-
sibilities and influential prerogatives beyond simply represent-
ing the court at ceremonial functions and sitting at the head of
the conference table."3 From the beginning, the Chief Justice
presided in open court and in conference. He probably
assumed some administrative responsibilities over the court
clerk, court reporter, and bailiff. The duties involved in keep-
ing the court effective would be assumed by the Chief Justice
as well. Thus, in any discussion of leadership, the Chief Justice
must be given some credit. Unfortunately, no descriptive
account exists that details the Chief Justice's responsibilities
during the inaugural period. However, some indication of the
132. See F. LATHAM, THE GREAT DISSENTER (1970).
133. Figures in Table 8 were arrived at by counting all subsequent citations
reported in Shepard's Washington Citations. See A CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note
20, at 253.
134. See generally C. DUCAT & V. FLANGO, LEADERSHIP IN STATE SUPREME
COURTS (1976); A CENTURY OF JUDGING, supra note 20, at 327-28; Danelski, The
Influence of the Chief Justice in the Decisional Process, COURTS, JUDGES AND POLITICS
(Murphy & Pritchett eds. 1979).
1989]
280 University of Puget Sound Law Review
distractions that the office imposed is found in the data from
Washington Reports.
Because at age fifty-one, he was the most senior member
of the new court, Theodore Anders was chosen Chief Justice
by his colleagues.135 Table 3 indicated that he had the lowest
number of majority opinions of the five judges. Perhaps the
duties of office prevented him from assuming his equal share
of the opinion assignments. While Anders was Chief Justice,
he wrote 97 of his 181 opinions, and 84 after he had turned the
office over to Judge Dunbar. Dunbar had written 118 opinions
before he was Chief Justice and 165 after assuming the duties
as head of the court. If the burden of writing the court opin-
ions was any indication, the Chief Justice had little to do and
was able to be a fully contributing member of the court in the
struggle against the ever-increasing docket.
In a court of five members, a single vote could often make
the difference in the outcome of the case. A judge who persist-
ently provided the single deciding vote in a three-to-two divi-
sion was in a position of significance. Even a four-to-one vote
gave the two judges who made the difference a degree of influ-
ence. Thus, the importance of the "swing" vote should be rec-
ognized in any calculation of effectiveness on the bench.3 6
TABLE 9
SWING VOTE EFFECTIVENESS INDEX






Judges Anders, Stiles, and Scott, more often than Judges Dun-
135. Elmon Scott was the youngest at 36. Dunbar, Stiles, and Hoyt were 44, 41,
and 48 respectively. Anders began his duties on November 11, 1889, and relinquished
his office to Judge Dunbar on January 9, 1893. Dunbar served until January 14, 1895.
136. The "swing" vote index was arrived at by simply giving to the majority
members in a four-to-one decision each one-fourth (.25) of the credit for the decision,
and in a three-to-two decision, the members of the majority received one-third (.33) of
the credit for the outcome. The grand total for each judge is the total score in all of
the cases involving a dissent over the five-year period covered. See Shapley & Shubik,
A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System, 48 AM.
POL. Sci. REV. 787 (1954); G. SCHUBERT, JUDICIAL BEHAVIOR: A READER IN THEORY
AND RESEARCH (1964).
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bar and Hoyt, provided the third vote for a majority opinion or
the fourth vote to consolidate the majority. They, and espe-
cially Judge Anders, were the swing voters, and thus occupied
positions of some influence.
It would be expected that the degree of cohesion found
among the judges could be attributed to the backgrounds of the
jurists and to the effectivness of one or another of the judges.
The backgrounds of the judges had much to do with forming
their political and legal attitudes and an effective judge could
have melded these into a cohesive bench. The data suggests
similar backgrounds that should lead to considerable cohesion.
Yet, the data also indicates the absence of an effective manager
of court business and of the members of the bench. However,
effectiveness is an elusive and many-faceted phenomenon. By
considering the several indicators of effectiveness together, a
better perspective may emerge.
TABLE 10
COMPOSITE EFFECTIVENESS
Number Average Agreement Opinion
Majority Opinion Swing Between No. of Dissonance Writing Composite
Judges Opinions Votes Vote Judges Citations Rating1 3 7 Leadership Ranking
Table 3 Table 7 Table 9 Table 5 Table 8 Table 4 Table 6
Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank
Dunbar 3 1 4 4 2 3 1 1(18)
Stiles 1 5 2 3 3 1 3 1(18)
Anders 5 3 1 1 1 5 4 3 (20)
Scott 4 4 3 2 4 2 5 4 (24)
Hoyt 2 2 5 5 5 4 2 5(25)
The composite ranking of the judges placed Dunbar and
Stiles as the most effective members of the bench and Judge
Anders as an influential member as well. However, each of
the judges, with the exceptions of Hoyt and Scott, enjoyed a
primary ranking on at least one of the indicators of effective-
ness. Clearly, no one jurist was able, or willing, to sway his
colleagues or to set the course for the court. Perhaps, at best,
we can conclude that Judges Hoyt and Scott were not strong
137. Table 4 data on dissonance provides clues for effectiveness. Ideally, unanimity
was reached after the clash of varying views. However, unanimity could have also
signified the lack of a thorough exchange of ideas among the jurists. Thus, it would be
reasonable to expect that those judges whose dissonance level hovered about the court
mean (9.5%) were striking a practical balance between the extremes represented by
Judges Hoyt and Anders. Judges Stiles and Scott provided the balance suggested.
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factors in the negotiations and informal consultations involved
in the court's decisional process.
Judge Anders, had he participated more in the delibera-
tions, might have emerged as the future manager of the court.
It was said of Judge Anders that he
was a very conscientious judge, so much that it was hard for
him to come to a decision. He was well grounded in the gen-
eral principles of the law, but he would spend an inconceiv-
able amount of time in looking up authorities in support of
even fundamental principles. He seemed to be as anxious to
render his opinions satisfactory to the layman as to members
of the bar.138
VIII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The foregoing analysis indicates that the court had no sin-
gle effective leader. No single judge emerged consistently
from the various measures of effectiveness available from the
data in Washington Reports. Judges Stiles, Dunbar, and
Anders each held sway over some aspect of the court's work.
No one justice dominated the bench.
This brief analysis of the exercise of judicial review sug-
gests that an important factor which kept the judges divided,
at least in the crucial constitutional cases, was their view of the
proper role-activist or restraintist-of the state's highest
bench. Perhaps Stiles' lack of legislative experience, con-
trasted with Dunbar's years in both houses of the territorial
legislature, instilled in the latter a greater respect for the prod-
uct of the legislative process. For that matter, except for a
stint as city attorney, Stiles had not held an elective public
office prior to his election to the bench, contributing to his less
than respectful attitude toward the products of the legislative
process. Judges Stiles, Anders, and Hoyt, the moderate to
activist judges, all received their legal education at a law school
or law department of an institution of higher learning. Both
Judges Scott and Dunbar joined the ranks of the bar after
office study under the supervision of a practicing attorney. On-
the-job training in an intern relationship characteristic of
clerking may have made them more cautious than their col-
leagues who had initially learned the law in the more abstract
and isolated law school environment.
138. C. REINHART, supra note 76, at 92.
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The data also suggests that the judges tended to disagree
more than expected in matters other than over the proper
approach to judicial review. Of course, by modern standards
and by comparison with the United States Supreme Court,139
the state's high bench appeared to be fairly cohesive. However,
within the context of the times, and given their similar back-
grounds and identical politics, the judges were divided unex-
pectedly often.
Of course, differences among the judges must be attributed
to different perspectives regarding the law. Again, the Wash-
ington Reports could provide some clues. For example, the rel-
ative low level of agreement between Judges Dunbar and Hoyt
could be due to contrasting views of proper judicial procedures.
Dunbar tended to be most reluctant to overturn a trial decision
or insist upon a new trial while Hoyt tended to be more critical
of procedures. 140 A computation of cases beyond 1895, in which
both Hoyt and Dunbar participated, would likely confirm their
contrasting perspectives regarding "due process" or court
procedures.
Relying exclusively on the data available from the Wash-
ington Reports to understand the judiciary, of course, has lim-
its. Indeed, more questions are generated than answered.
Nonetheless, the initial step in analysis is to generate meaning-
ful questions. In this we have succeeded, but the answers evade
us. The next step is to go the archives, newspapers, personal
accounts, and memorabilia to confirm our speculations. Unfor-
tunately, the primary sources on which we could rely to test
our expectations are unavailable, lost to history. One would
hope that the history of the second century of the Washington
Supreme Court will not suffer this loss. The judges have made
and will make their mark on the history of the state. A com-
plete record of their endeavors must be preserved and later
made available.
139. Peterson, Dissent in American Courts, 43 J. POL. 412 (1981).
140. For example, in Pacific Cable v. McNatt, 2 Wash. 216, 27 P. 869 (1891),
Dunbar was emphatic: "In my opinion, the judgment in this case cannot be disturbed
without usurping the province of the jury." Id. at 220. See also Going v. Cook, 1 Wash.
224, 23 P. 412 (1890); McGraw v. Franklin, 2 Wash. 17, 26 P. 810 (1891). See Hoyt's vote
and opinion in State ex reL Coella v. Fenimore, 2 Wash. 370, 26 P. 807 (1891); Oregon
Ry. & Navig. Co. v. Smalley, 1 Wash. 206, 23 P. 1008 (1890); Pierce v. Frace, 2 Wash. 81,
26 P. 807 (1891).
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